The economics of public service reform
Grout and Stevens ( 2003 ) specify public service as “ … any service provided for a big figure of citizens, in which there is a possible important market failure, loosely interpreted to include equity every bit good as efficiency, warranting authorities involvement-whether in production, finance or regulation” ( p. 216 ) . Examples of public services available in most of the developed universe scope from such cardinal demands of modern life such as H2O, electricity, and waste direction to services that, while of import, could be considered less indispensable, like public transit or societal services. The ongoing combative conflict in the United States over government-provided health-care gaining controls the kernel of the argument over the boundaries of authorities engagement in service proviso, particularly in more capitalistic societies like the U.S.
The demand for public services can be generated by the supply side of the market, with some services like public transit and public-service corporations trusting on authorities engagement to forestall market failure or opprobrious monopolies, while other services are motivated from by the demand side, as seen with national defense mechanism and jurisprudence enforcement services with the authorities supplying for the general service on behalf of the citizens instead than the citizens paying for it straight ( Grout and Stevens, 2003 ) .
Much like an electricity web or a fire section, instruction is a service that the most authoritiess in the developed universe finance and in which they are profoundly invested. In the nineteenth century when most instruction systems were private and available merely to those who could afford it, instruction reformists fought for equal entree to instruction for all income degrees, reasoning that an educated people could relieve the effects of poorness and make a more cohesive society ( Thattai, 2001 ) . Today, an educated public is linked to a state ‘s economic success, particularly in Fieldss such as mathematics, scientific discipline and medical specialty ( Lain, 2007 ) . Consequently, it is critical that the authorities be invested in bettering the quality of the instruction in order to advance pupil accomplishment and equality along racial, gender, and economic lines ( Rand, 2009 ) .
Economic success is merely one ground the authorities has a vested involvement in the quality of the instruction its financess provide and is elaborately involved in the proviso of instruction to the point where it straight manages schools and is the chief employer in the instruction sector ( Grout and Stevens, 2003 ) . Particularly in the United States, where falling trial tonss in mathematics and scientific discipline are worrisome in a universe dominated by engineering and scientific invention, there have been multiple efforts to reform the public instruction sector in order to better pupil performance—one of the cardinal indexs of a working educational system ( McClusky, 2006 ) .
Harmonizing to Chait ( 2009 ) , it is by and large accepted that skilled instructors are valuable, but in recent old ages, it has become evident that province authoritiess and school territories do non hold equal systems for pulling, developing, and retaining effectual instructors and that betterment in this country would give long-run dividends for both instructors and pupils. To develop such systems, some reforms have linked teacher wage to student public presentation and in support of this procedure, the U.S. federal authorities created the Teacher Incentive Fund ( TIF ) which provides discretional grants to high-need school territories that develop and implement performance-based instructor and chief compensation systems ( USDoE, 2009 ) . TIF grants are besides intended to back up calling ladders for teachers—a critical tool for retaining the best teachers—as good as bettering instructional accomplishments throughout the full school ( Chait and Miller, 2009 ) .
The intent of this paper is to analyze the economic instance for performance-based wage reform plans in the U.S. public instruction system utilizing the TIF plan as an illustration. It will foremost do the instance for continued public support of instruction through a treatment market failures and equity concerns in that sector. Second, the paper will analyse general performance-based wage plan reforms in U.S. public instruction, placing its aims and cardinal characteristics and supplying economic grounds to back up the statement that the reform is accomplishing its aims. It will so supply a brief description of the TIF plan: the service it provides, the stakeholders, and its aims and how it supports wider teacher wage reforms. Finally, the paper will pull decisions about whether the performance-based wage plans like TIF should go on to be implemented.
Market Failures And Equity Concerns In Public Education
Stiglitz ( 2000 ) identifies two current major issues—a lag in productiveness and increased inequality—and both have played a cardinal function in the argument over U.S. public instruction reform. He farther explains that while the grounds behind the reduced productiveness are undecided, economic experts and policy shapers agree that betterments in human capital are critical to increasing productiveness growing and that a strong instruction system is critical to that end ( Stigliz, 2000 ) .
Bipartisan consensus on the importance of instruction exists, but there are major contentions over how best to accomplish a high-quality instruction system that is available to all members of the community, irrespective of income ( Stigliz, 2000 ) . Education is non a “pure public good” ( Stiglitz, 2000 ) and economic experts by and large agree that it possesses qualities that imply that market proviso could take to potentially serious market failures, taking to lower degrees of educational attainment in a population than would maximise social public assistance ( Friedman, 1962 and Smith, 1976 [ 1776 ] as cited in Mitch, 2008, pp136 ) . Markets are imperfect in that they can make, harmonizing to Riley ( 2006 ) an ‘unacceptable ‘ distribution of income and excessively high a degree of societal exclusion where people with low income are denied entree to indispensable goods, services and chances. Ball ( 1993 ) put it more compactly: “ … unequal distribution of income in society may bias certain market [ s ] in favor of the rich and against the poor” ( p. 10 ) . This bias extends to the instruction market, where democratic control of schools can take to a system of ‘winners ‘ and ‘losers ‘ ( Chubb and Moe, 1990 ) . Such an unjust result is labelled by economic experts as “market failure” ( Bator, 1958 and Cowen, 1988 as cited in Mitch, 2008, p. 136 ) .
The beginning of market failures discussed therefore far consequence in economic inefficiency in the absence of authorities intercession. But even if the economic system were Pareto efficient Stiglitz ( 2000 ) identifies two more statements for authorities intercession: income distribution and the fact that persons may non move in their ain best involvement. Education differs from other trade goods in important ways, a fact made apparent by the contention over whether additions in educational outgo lead to increased pupil public presentation ( Stiglitz, 2000 ) . While many economic experts believe that outgos make a greater difference in pupil public presentation than earlier surveies suggested ( Stiglitz, 2006 ) , the research shows the overpowering importance of instructor quality, which it is non closely related to wages, instruction, or experience ( Hanushek, 1971 ) .
However, these are non the lone statements in favor of a public instruction system ; there are “merit-good” and “equity” statements as good ( Grout and Stevens, 2003 ) . Mitch ( 2008 ) states that one of the more common factors in the failure of instruction markets is the trouble parents have in borrowing money to finance their kids ‘s instruction because of imperfectnesss in capital markets. Therefore, if instruction were genuinely equal, it should be provided outside of the range of capital markets, where pupils who merit an instruction but can non afford one would profit. Mitch ( 2008 ) identifies a 2nd job with instruction, in that it possesses “ … the non-excludability and non-rivalry characteristics of public goods” ( p. 136 ) . Much like the early instruction reformists who touted the wider social benefits of equality in instruction, he argues that if instruction leads people become involved members of their communities and less prone to criminal behavior, it benefits society as a whole, non merely the person ( Mitch, 2008 ) .
Analysis: Impact Of Performance-Based Pay For Teachers
In the U.S. , local communities traditionally have been responsible for their ain primary and secondary public instruction systems, which they chiefly finance through local revenue enhancements, with extra support from the province and federal authoritiess. Through this local ownership system, school boards have the power to find schools ‘ course of study and to engage and fire instructors ( Stiglitz, 2000 ) . Likewise, school boards are responsible for paying the instructors in their employ and an overpowering bulk do so harmonizing to salary agendas based on old ages in service and the highest grade attained ( Winters et Al, 2008 ) . Harmonizing to a national study, near to 100 per centum of traditional public school instructors are employed in school territories that use these types of agendas ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Therefore, about 3.1 million public school instructors are paid chiefly harmonizing to their old ages of experience and instruction level—two variables which weakly correlative with pupil accomplishment ( Hanushek, 2003, as cited in Pudgursky, 2007 ) . This compensation construction can make a system that rewards instructors who simply remain employed for a long period or who complete advanced grades, instead than instructors who perform their occupations efficaciously.
It is this construction that has come under onslaught by both policy shapers and researches in recent old ages and has been the focal point of reform ( Winters et Al, 2008 ) . There is strong consensus that the manner instructors are paid does small to pull gifted campaigners to the profession or to high-need schools ( Chait and Miller, 2009 ) . Nor does the current system reward the most effectual instructors. Some reformists call for federal support to advanced plans designed to develop better instructor payment theoretical accounts, specifically 1s that recognize and wages instruction excellence and generate equal entree for kids in poorness ( Chait and Miller, 2009 ) .
Following the influential A State at Risk study, a figure of school territories experimented with performance-based wage plans in an attempt to better pupil accomplishment and reform the about cosmopolitan individual wage agenda ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . The accent on performance-based wage plans recognizes the consensus that teacher quality is the basis of instruction ( Winters et Al, 2008 ) . Recent panel informations analyses suggest that teacher quality is one of the most of import forecasters of pupil accomplishment ( Rivkin et al, 2005 as cited in Winters, 2008 ) . Performance-based wage protagonists suggest that it induces teacher productiveness through the proviso of fiscal inducements, much like workers in private companies who receive wage additions and fillips based on public presentation ( Winters et Al, 2008 ) .
However, Winters et Al ( 2008 ) place of import differences in motive between the public instruction sector and private houses, possibly the most of import being the by and large held outlook that instructors be, in portion, internally motivated to supply high-quality service in a manner that private workers are non. One statement asserts that performance-based wage policies penalize instructors because of this outlook, while workers in private companies may be compensated in an effort to promote them to make their possible, non because they have already done so. Another consistent unfavorable judgment of performance-based wage policies is that it does non acknowledge instructors who, out of love for their profession and pupils, are already motivated to supply the best quality instruction services they can ( Winters et Al, 2008 ) . Criticisms stemming from these treatments claim a deficiency of support by instructors for performance-based wage reform and have thwarted reformists ‘ efforts to develop and implement such plans ( Murnane and Cohen, 1986 ) .
Research on these plans highlighted other built-in troubles. Hurdless exist in making dependable and incorporate procedures for placing effectual instructors, mensurating their effectivity, extinguishing discriminatory intervention, and standardising assessment systems across school territories ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Murnane and Cohen ( 1986 ) offer one of the most influential reviews of merit-based wage plans, reasoning that old reforms failed because learning does non easy impart itself to performance-based compensation—which Goldhaber et Al ( 2005 ) termed the “nature of teaching” hypothesis ( as cited in Pudgursky, 2007, p.922 ) . Given the hypothesis ‘ influence and the fact that subsequent critics frequently raise the same statements, it is, hence, deserving giving some attending to statements against teacher performance-based wage plans.
Trouble in teacher public presentation monitoring is a major statement against performance-based wage ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Unlike other professions, teacher public presentation is hard to mensurate because input is non readily measured in a just and dependable mode, and, unlike an lawyer ‘s billable hours or a truck driver ‘s bringings, a instructor ‘s end product is non marketed ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Therefore, it is argued that the value of instruction services provided by an single instructor can non be readily measured, since pupil accomplishment is influenced by many other factors that the instructor does non command ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . This statement had more relevancy before major technological progresss introduced computerized informations systems throughout school territories ; nevertheless, it is of import to observe that there are still concerns about the dependability of teacher value-added estimations and some research workers express cautiousness in construing instructor effects strictly as an property ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) .
Pudgursky ( 2007 ) identifies team productiveness as a 2nd statement against performance-based wage plans. Teachers work as members of a squad and presenting single performance-based wage inducements might decrease inter-teacher cooperation and accordingly cut down, instead than increase, overall school public presentation ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Some critics further argue that these plans can destruct squad kineticss between instructors every bit good as decision makers, particularly if decision makers must honor single instructor public presentation ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . However, this statement is debatable, sing that most instructors work in a comparatively little squads and economic literature suggests inducements may work rather good in little squads because of common monitoring and reciprocation and the easiness of communicating among team members ( Kandel and Lazear, 1992 ) .
Another unfavorable judgment of performance-based wage plans concerns the issue of multi-tasking when trusting on trials or other quantitative steps of instructor public presentation, which is debatable when a worker ‘s public presentation is multi-dimensional, but merely certain facets are measured and go the footing for inducements ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . When an organisation ‘s overall mission and the activity to which inducements are attached are non aligned, employees tend to switch work toward the rewarded activity, pretermiting other activities critical to the organisation ‘s success ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) , which can happen when instructors focus on “teaching the test” to fix pupils for standardised scrutinies, instead than learning the basicss trial is designed to mensurate.
A performance-based wage plan tends to pull and retain persons who perform good the activity to which inducements are attached and repel those who do non ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . However, in one of his ain instance surveies outside of instruction, Lazear ( 2000 ) discerned a more elusive, but of import factor in additions from performance-based wage systems originating from labour market choice. He found that screening effects were both significant and approximately equal in magnitude to motive effects ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) and noted that this consequence can explicate productiveness additions ( Lazear, 2000 ) . In other words, the inducement system non merely raised the productiveness of the single worker, but besides raised the overall quality of the general work force ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Some research workers further speculate that this choice will be a important factor in teacher labour market. Surveies of instructor turnover systematically find that where ability is defined by a instructor ‘s public presentation on the ACT or National Teacher Exam, high-ability instructors are more likely than low-ability instructors to go forth the profession ( Murnane and Olsen, 1990 as cited in Pudgursky, 2007 p.930 ) ; nevertheless, this tendency may be attributed to pay restraints within the profession instead than the attractive force of other market chances ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) .
A recent survey by Hoxby and Leigh ( 2004 ) found grounds that the migration of high-ability adult females out of learning between 1960 and the nowadays was chiefly the consequence of “push” of low instructor wage compensation instead than the “pull” of greater non-teaching chances ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Pudgursky ( 2007 ) states that although higher compensable chances for both high and low-ability instructors increased outside the profession, it was the instruction system ‘s limited wage compensation that accelerated the issue of high-ability instructors. Assuming that high-ability instructors were more effectual in the schoolroom, he farther speculates that it is likely that a performance-based wage plan would hold kept more of them learning ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) .
Over the last decennary, research workers have begun to work monolithic longitudinal pupil accomplishment informations files across the state to set about “value-added” surveies of instructor effectivity ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . The consequences have of import effects for the performance-based wage argument: on the one manus it suggests that credential-based wage reforms are non likely to hold significant effects on pupil, while on the other, it points to significant pupil accomplishment additions if the mix of low and high-performing instructors can be adjusted ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Multiple surveies carried out in school territories throughout the U.S. systematically found grounds of big fluctuation in achievement tonss between schoolrooms and instructors, proposing that instructors can hold a significant consequence on pupil accomplishment growing, peculiarly if teacher effects are cumulated over a figure of old ages ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) . Given these consequences, reform plans that tie pay to student public presentation over clip would be most effectual in enrolling or retaining more high-ability instructors and promote low-productivity instructors either to better, go forth, or reassign to non-teaching places ( Pudgursky, 2007 ) .
The Teacher Incentive Fund ( TIF ) Plan
The TIF plan is one of the many performance-based reforms implemented late. Its aims are:
Bettering pupil accomplishment by increasing instructor and chief effectivity ; Reforming instructor and chief compensation systems so that instructors and principals are rewarded for additions in pupil accomplishment ; Increasing the figure of effectual instructors learning hapless, minority, and disadvantaged pupils in hard-to-staff topics ; and Creating sustainable performance-based compensation systems ( USDoE, 2009 ) .
The plan, which is unfastened to local and province instruction bureaus every bit good as non-profit organisations, conducts in-classroom ratings of take parting instructors throughout the twelvemonth and buttockss success by betterments in pupil accomplishment, every bit good as other factors ( USDoE, 2009 ) . TIF, which is presently active in 31 U.S. provinces, besides provides long-run support to participants through the Center for Educator Compensation Reform ( CECR ) , which offers workshops, talks and conferences throughout the state, every bit good as online resources like its electronic library and plan database ( CECR, 2010 ) .
A alone characteristic of TIF is that funding from the federal authorities goes straight to take parting instructors, instead than the general province or local school budgets ( Chait and Miller, 2009 ) . This direct support is designed to counterbalance the take parting instructors, who assume increased functions and duties and it besides pays instructors in critical topic countries, like mathematics, scientific discipline, and particular instruction ( Chait and Miller, 2009 ) . Although the plan was implemented by the Bush disposal in 2006, it garners strong bi-partisan support. The current U.S. disposal has proposed a dramatic addition in the plan ‘s support from $ 97 million in 2009 to $ 487.3 million in 2010 ( Chait, 2009 ) . Since TIF has existed for a comparatively short clip, its effectivity is unsure ( Sawchuk, 2009 ) ; nevertheless, one-year plan growing and a dramatic addition in funding indicate that its initial impact on instructor public presentation is a positive one, which can be proved merely with extra long-run research.
Hanushek ( 2007 ) argues that to better the quality of instruction or, at the really least, guarantee that all pupils receive a minimal standard educational experience, historically provinces have developed a assortment of policies and ordinances designed to steer the actions of local territories. To be certain, these policies and ordinances must be adaptable to the local territories ‘ specific demands and civilization ( Hanushek, 2007 ) . Similarly, school budgetary determinations, which are finally political affecting a assortment of societal precedence trade-offs, must reflect the territory and pupils ‘ altering demands ( Hanushek, 2007 ) .
As a consequence, budgetary determinations can non be divorced from instruction policy ; hence, since the policy aim is to raise pupil public presentation, the school ‘s fiscal system must back up it ( Hanushek, 2007 ) . The manner that financess are distributed to schools introduces inducements for their behavior and disregarding that fact introduces a construction that limits both efficiency and public presentation ( Hanushek, 2007 ) . Therefore, for pupil accomplishment to better the school fiscal system must be harmonized with the policy construction, every bit good as provide and support improved inducements within schools ( Hanushek, 2007 ) .
Transforming teacher salary agendas is going an progressively cardinal subject in general instruction reform, nevertheless, knowledge about planing effectual plans is limited and so support for farther navigation and rating will be of import ( Rand, 2009 ) . Pay for public presentation should besides be combined with other reforms, such as aid to pedagogues to advance uninterrupted betterment in educational patterns ( Rand 2009 ) . Reform plans must stress the capacity to construction, use, and measure alternate inducements, which is what the U.S. authorities through the TIF plan is trying to make. While supplying construction and support, TIF is designed to promote local flexibleness, invention in teacher wage reform and enable hereafter research to analyze their part to education reform ( CECR, 2010 ) .
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Pudgursky ( 2007 ) high spots this value-added research, which begins with Sanders ‘ development of Tennessee ‘s Value Added and Assessment System ( Wright et al, 1997 ; Ballou et Al, 2004 ) and now includes provinces like Texas ( Rivkin et al, 2005 ) , and big urban territories like New York City ( Kane et al, 2006 ; Boyd et Al, 2006 ) , Chicago ( Aaronson et al, 2003 ) and San Diego ( Koedel and Betts, 2005 ) .